Who Owns Morocco?

The last two weeks have been, arguably, the busiest and most exciting in the Moroccan blogosphere. The banning of two Moroccan weeklies, Nichane and TelQuel (who’s August issues were seized then destroyed by the interior ministry before any legal order was issued), and of the french daily Le Monde, has triggered a webstorm of protests against yet another violation of Press freedom in the country. The banned publications were about to reveal the result of a poll conducted amongst Moroccans who were asked to assess the first decade of their king’s reign. Although the survey showed an overwhelming support for Mohammed VI, the whole process was considered illegal and the journalists deemed blasphemous: the king is considered sacred, he rules by Divine right and the constitution puts him above the law. In no way, the traditionalists argued, he should have been assessed or his work evaluated.

While Moroccans are widely believed to be strongly attached to the 12 century old royal institution, which many consider as an inseparable component of their national identity, democrats and progressists, who never questioned the legitimacy of the monarchy, have long been pointing at the incompatibility between an executive monarch who reigns and rules on the one hand, and the need for a genuinely democratic and accountable state on the other. These fundamental contradictions have led many journalists, civil and human rights activists, ordinary citizens to pay the price for daring to confront the government, or by extension the establishment (the Makhzen as it is widely dubbed in Morocco) as materialized in this affair.

The problem in Morocco is that an organic component of democracy, accountability, has been willingly disabled, and criticism of the real power holders is de facto incapacitated. In other words, the country has a government who is vociferously and persistently claiming democracy, but who is ruled by a monarch who controls every aspect of power:

The king is head of the executive, although, and for the sake of protocol, he is flanked by a prime minister who’s role has been emptied and who transformed, in the prime minister’s own words [Fr], into an executioner of royal edicts and rulings decided on behalf of the elected government, by the royal cabinet, the real administration of the country, composed of a batch of highly trained, apolitical technocrats who are kept beyond the scope of any form of answerability apart from that of the monarch himself.

The monarch is also technically in control of the legislature (indirectly, as a jurist friend of mine might add), whereby law proposals emitted by the palace are approved without further discussion or debate whilst alternative law proposals which might be considered challenging for the establishment (they seldom pop up under the parliament’s roof anyway) are opposed after swift discussions or dismissed out of hand within parliamentary groups if deemed too “contentious.”

All the rulings, verdicts and laws in the land are pronounced under the name of the king who also enjoys the role of a military and religious leader (Amir Al’Mou’minine or Prince of the Believers).

The current state of affairs and the obvious autocratic regime that it breeds is prescribed by the constitution of the country which, the traditionalists would claim, was approved by “national consensus.” The text was first promulgated back in 1962, right after independence from colonial France, from which it borrowed the main outlines with the purported ambition to establish a modern state run by powerful and independent institutions. But it was then amended eight times in order to further increase the king’s prerogatives – indeed written for and by late Hassan II, a jurist incidentally who submitted the text to eight popular referenda, all blatantly rigged and engineered to look (mostly to the the outside world, or at least this was the thinking of those in charge) as overwhelming popular endorsements for the monarch and his proposed system of governance, with often approval rates surpassing the 99 percent mark.

I become politically conscious in the late 90s, at the end of the reign of Hassan II, when the country was enjoying a democratic “spring,” gained after decades of struggle for freedom, equality and democracy, mainly conducted by the Moroccan left. The late king having lost his strategic clout after the end of the cold war and sensing his death approaching, had no choice in order to preserve the monarchy, but to give back to an elected executive, although partially, the prerogatives he has been keeping for himself for too long. He freed political prisoners and cautiously accepted to start a process of democratization that will guaranty a smooth transfer of power to his son.

The accession of the socialists to the government -companions of late Mehdi Ben Barka-, the political virginity and the purported reputation of benevolence of Mohammed VI, who succeeded his deceased father in July 1999, all this preluded very optimistic expectations. They were exhilarating times.

But neither the apparent inclusiveness of the regime toward historic opposition parties (which turned out to be mere cooptation), nor the advent of Mohammed VI has resulted in democracy. Quite the contrary.

Independent media, bloggers, human rights activists, even the own cousin of the king, they all learned very early on that what was actually happening is a replacement of the old guard by a new and younger one, made up of close friends of the monarch, influential businessmen, powerful landowners, military figures: a new Makhzen.

Attacks on freedom of speech have been mounting recently (please read links about Mohamed Erraji , Fouad Mourtada, Zahra Boudkour [Fr] amongst many others). The latest of which was the banning of the aforementioned poll, triggering an immediate and spontaneous protest reaction that arose mainly amongst bloggers, spiraling into a Twitterstorm that led to the creation of a Facebook group calling itself “I’m a 9%” (made up of a little less than a thousand members now), and a Hashtag page on twitter. The “I’m a Ninepercenter” epithet, which refers to the 9% of people in the poll who declared being unsatisfied with the first decade of Mohammed VI, was never meant as a polarizing theme. Indeed many of the group members declare being part of the 91% satisfied, yet they chose to join the movement basically to protest a pattern of recurrent attacks on freedom of expression.

I put the question on the Facebook group pages, under the rather flashy -I have to admit- slogan: Give me a Five for Morocco! basically asking people to give me five urgent measures that they, members, would consider most needed for the country, and the result I hastily gathered showed quite an interesting (non scientific) outcome.

Out of the 35 people who answered my request, almost half felt that a constitutional reform was needed in the sense of establishing a parliamentary monarchy, equivalent to the Spanish or the British. Another half estimated that education was a priority in a country that is still plagued by widespread illiteracy with an estimated shameful figure of 60%. Overall, measures proposed by correspondents came, in terms of popularity, in that order:

Constitutional reform and the establishment of a parliamentary monarchy.
Reform of the educational system and the eradication of illiteracy.
Reform of the judiciary, insuring its total independence.
Ensuring a more just economy, freed from the hegemony of the Moroccan establishment (the Makhzen).
Ensuring freedoms; all freedoms.
Separating state from religion and ensuring freedom of conscience.
Fighting corruption.
Ensuring a more equitable health system.
Rethinking the country’s foreign policy.
Unifying the progressive/leftist forces.
Reform of the administration; getting rid of the burden of a heavy bureaucracy.
Working on improving mentalities (sic).
Promoting solidarity and reforming social policies.
Ensuring the principle of equality.
Reforming the electoral system.
Reconciling with the past, correcting present violations and preventing by means of law any recurrence in the future.
Strengthening the moral and symbolic roles of the monarch.

(Please see details here.)

As I say, this exercise is in no way meant to be statistically accurate nor representative. It reflects mainly the point of view of young, cosmopolitan and educated, most likely left leaning Moroccans.

At this stage one can’t help wondering, as veteran pro-democracy militant Moumen Diouri pioneered in asking: Who owns Morocco? And not only in economic terms. To whom belongs morocco? A basic question that ought to be answered through a badly needed constitutional reform. Do not the people deserve the right to have a say on how they are governed and on who really governs them?

Moroccans have always been infantilized and hold as immature by the system, the country run as if it was owned by one person. The Nine Percent movement symbolizes this progressive segment of the Moroccan population who wants to reclaim what, at the end of the analysis, belongs to the people: a land they collectively own, a government they pay and therefore should be able to hold accountable, a fabulous and rich history they should be able to revisit, rewrite if need be, beside a tradition they hold dear and a monarchy they undoubtedly respect.

Further sources and links about the 9 percent movement:

Le Parisien – Le «mouvement des 9%» soutient «Le Monde» [FR]
Libération – Une liberté d’expression reelle mai non garantie [FR]
The National (UAE) – Moroccan Dissent Alive on Twitter
Le Blog des Blogs/Courrier International – Beacoup de bruit pour 9% de marocains [FR]
Arret sur image – Sondage censuré: La Blogosphère marocaine partagée [FR]
Maghrebia – Morocco’s blogosphere buzzes over the banning of two magazines
The Nine-Percenters: A Moroccan micro-blogging mutiny by Ted Scheinman and Aaron Wiener in The Online Journalism Review
Jillian C. York for Global Voices Online – Morocco: Bloggers React to the Banning of Magazines
Jillian C. York for the Huffington Post – In Morocco, 91% Approval isn’t Good Enough
The Nine Percent Nation by Jesse Walker for the Reason
Jillian C. York evoking the Nine Pourcenters on a radio Interview for WorldStream Radio
Global Voices en Français » Maroc : “Je suis un 9%” – Des blogueurs réagissent à la censure d’un sondage [Fr]

Why I’m a Nine Percenter

“Morocco is a state which operates far from optimal because it has too little relay. Most of the public space is squatted by the clamor of a great orchestra of nihilist pest, whose members compete in nuisance, insensitive to the terrible damage they have inflicted on this nation.” Khalid Naciri, Minister of Information and spokesperson for the Moroccan government in Le Matin (state run), 5 August 2009.

My blogging activities have been very rare lately, mostly for professional reasons but also because I have been busy twitting and Facebooking for and about freedom of speech in Morocco. So I found it convenient -although this issue is no longer making the headlines- to just copy and paste the text bellow of an interview I had by e-mail with writer, activist, blogger and friend Jillian C. York to share it with anyone dropping over in case they were wondering: Nine Percent what?

Interview with Jillian C York, 3 August 2009.
See also Jillian’s piece for the Huffington Post.

1. Why do you think the government is so eager to clamp down on the two publications, particularly in light of the fact that 91% of those polled actually support the monarchy?

The government’s reaction might understandably be seen as odd for an outsider: why on earth would any government bring itself opposition and ban the results of a poll that shows figures of overwhelming endorsement of the regime? But to be rightly understood, the attitude of the Moroccan government should always be seen in the scope of the country’s history and of the kind of special relationship that the monarchy wants to perpetuate with the Moroccan people: an adult-to-child kind of relationship. In other words, the common belief inside the circles of power, amongst members of the establishment, the wealthy landowners, the businessmen close to the power, the security bosses, the notables who’s power and privileges depend upon a continuation of the status quo, and within the royal family itself is that any opening of the public space which might empower the masses might also signal a process of accountability that may end up dismantling this whole system of nepotism that the Moroccan oligarchy counts on.
Having all this in mind, one can easily understand the mind process behind these repeated attacks against freedom of expression, driven by the principle that ordinary Moroccans should always be remembered that the Makhzen (or the Moroccan establishment as described above) should not and can not be subject to any judgement, criticism, assessment or study regardless of their outcome. “Sacred Institution” is the phrase often used to hide the more down-to-earth motives exposed earlier.

2. Do you see Moroccan press laws (and their application) as regressing?

The press is relatively free to address many subjects in comparison with other neighboring countries, but the Press Law explicitly restricts the scope of expression to the confines of so-called red lines providing for imprisonment in such vague terms that it exposes journalists to liability from a judiciary that is far from being independent anyway. All in all, the media has to deal with the inextricable dilemma of trying to comment public and political life in the country without being allowed to have an objective analysis of the centers of power, which lie mainly between the king’s hands, who’s hegemony covers, de facto, the executive, the judiciary, the military and religion. From this perspective, yes, the Press Law is regressive.

3. Although the Interior Ministry has spoken, why do you think there’s silence from the royal family on this issue?

I think it has to do with at least three aspects of the monarchy and the existing customs. One: Mohammed VI, contrary to his father has quite a low key approach to politics. Since his accession to the throne he has surrounded himself with an army of spokespersons, a novelty for the monarchy, serving as a buffer between the public and the palace, and has noticeably avoided contacts with the media. Indeed he has never given a press conference and his rare interviews were mainly conducted in a written rather than spoken form. So this aspect may explain in part, the apparent detachment of the king even in matters that might concern him in person, like in the issue at hand. Two: the very nature of the Moroccan system, where the monarch rules by “divine right,” doesn’t allow for the “commander of the believers,” who’s by essence not only above the law but also beyond the reach of common mortals, to descend into the public debate and enter controversial debate with those who are supposed to be his subjects. Three: Often in matters of lése-majestè, the king has usually had a distant approach: a mixture of both condescendent and indifferent postures. This allows him retrospectively the room for -at his discretion- granting pardons to whom he chooses, hence having the possibility to claim his gratuitousness and charity which often plays well with both domestic and foreign constituencies.

4. Do you foresee any legal repercussions on Ahmed Benchemsi?

The authorities have long adopted a cynical modus operandi as far as punishing discourteous journalists is concerned. Each time there is enough mobilization of the civil society and/or the international opinion against their actions, they systematically avoid jail sentences and resort to more subtle ways to pressure “offending” journalists. They use a Press Code that is specifically designed to impose colossal fines then wait for the media attention to fade away to launch a sophisticated campaign of economic boycott and demonization. Benchemssi has been for some time now on the Makhzen’s radar screen and fortunately for him and for freedom of the Press in Morocco, he has been allowed so far to keep on working and publishing his magazines. An opportunity that some of his colleagues, especially in the printed Arabic speaking press, have not been granted. Thanks to the support Benchemssi and his publications have inside and outside of the country, and hopefully with the campaign of support that took upon itself to denounce the seizure of the magazines and the censorship of the results of the poll, he might be allowed to go back publishing Nichane and TelQuel. He probably will be sentenced to pay a huge fine and then the Makhzen will concentrate on the business of bringing him and the people who work with him on their knees.
That’s unfortunately how it works in Morocco.

5. What effect do you think the Twitter and Facebook campaigns will have?

To be honest, I’m not sure whether this campaign which started quite spontaneously, will have any practical, short-term effect on the issue at hand. And I believe that it will take more that an online campaign to change the rigid and quite regressive mindset that is at the core of the main problems that hold Morocco behind. Of course the campaign and those who participated in it can not be scientifically considered representative of Moroccans as a whole, but what I’m quite sure about is that the campaign and the energetic response to it, shows without the shred of a doubt that whilst the majority supports and adheres to the royal family and the person of the monarch, they are eager to see the existing system evolve so that they at last can be considered as adults, capable of expressing themselves responsibly without having an intrusive government lecturing them on what they should watch, read, say or hear.